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How objective and subjective knowledge affect insurance choices 
 
 
ABSTRACT   
This study investigates the effect of objective knowledge (OK) and subjective knowledge (SK) 
on real-life insurance choices, a non-trivial, information rich choice task with no dominant 
option. Prior research has shown that OK and SK tend to be correlated, but that is not always the 
case. By using a novel approach to manipulate SK – which could be adapted by salespeople in 
real-world contexts – we ensured that levels of SK and OK were not always in accord.  Clear 
patterns emerged showing an inverse relationship between SK and OK, and the number of 
problem framing (or structuring) related statements made, number of overall information 
processing operations performed, and the time spent to reach a decision.  Most of the extra effort 
expended by low SK/ low OK individuals was spent framing the problem, not executing decision 
rules such as making attribute comparisons. Those with high OK were also less prone to 
misunderstanding product information.  Whether high or low SK/OK, there were no differences 
in final choices, suggesting that neither group jumped to a simplifying choice heuristic.  Instead, 
those low in knowledge compensated for this deficiency by taking more time framing the 
problem and reaching a thoughtful decision, a decision strategy that weakens the effect of 
branding. 
 
Keywords:  objective/subjective knowledge, information processing operations, verbal 
protocols, insurance  
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INTRODUCTION 
The type of knowledge one has stored in memory influences consumers’ cognitive processes and 
decision outcomes. Objective knowledge (OK) represents the amount, type (such as declarative 
versus procedural knowledge) and/or organization of what an individual has stored in memory 
about a domain or product. OK has been shown to have an effect on the amount of information 
acquired (Bettman and Park, 1980b; Brucks 1985; Mishra and Kumar, 2011; Spence and Brucks, 
1997), the type of information acquired (Carlson, Bearden and Hardesty, 2007), information 
acquisition strategies (Bettman and Park, 1980a; Bettman and Sujan, 1987), and the time needed 
for processing task related information and reaching decisions (for opposing views, see Johnson, 
1988, and Spence and Brucks, 1997). 
However, OK is not the only factor that influences consumer’s decision-making. 
Subjective knowledge (SK) – how much an individual thinks they know about a particular 
domain – is also an influential criterion. SK has been shown to have an effect on consumers' 
decision time (Park and Lessig, 1981), how product information is used (Hadar, Sood and Fox, 
2013), what information is acquired (Brucks, 1985), and the importance attached to various 
pieces of information (Park, Gardner and Thukral, 1988). In spite of these SK related insights, it 
is surprising how little is known about how SK and OK differentially affect decision making 
(Hadar et al., 2013; Mishra and Kumar, 2011; Moorman, Diehl, Brinberg and Kidwell, 2004; 
Raju, Lonial and Mangold, 1995).   
In this paper, our goal is to investigate how OK and SK affect consumers’ decision-
making processes when choosing between five real-life house insurance policies, a non-trivial, 
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information rich choice task with no dominant option. We are not the first to compare and 
contrast OK to SK (for a meta-analysis addressing the correlation between these two constructs, 
see Carlson, Vincent, Hardesty and Bearden, 2009).  Generally these two constructs are 
correlated (Carlson et al., 2009), thus clouding the ability to discern differential effects (Mishra 
and Kumar, 2011; Raju et al., 1995). However, OK and SK need not be in concert.  For example, 
Hadar et al. (2013) found that raising OK can have the paradoxical effect of lowering one’s SK. 
Over- or under-estimating one’s knowledge level is not uncommon, although the tendency is to 
overestimate (Alba and Hutchinson, 2000). To reveal process and performance differences, most 
studies start with between group differences, such as comparing experts to novices (Johnson, 
1988; Spence and Brucks, 1997; Ackert, Church and Tkac, 2010), control for one while 
manipulating the other (Hadar et al., 2013), or measure OK/SK, not manipulate it (Mishra & 
Kumar, 2011; Raju et al., 1995). Studies in the finance domain are in short supply (Hadar et al., 
2013; Jacoby et al., 2001; Kuusela, Spence and Kanto, 1998; Mishra and Kumar, 2011). Herein 
we manipulate both OK and SK to achieve a balanced 2x2 (low/high SK by low/high OK) 
experimental design to unearth their relative effects. 
We start by reviewing relevant literature on objective knowledge (OK) and subjective 
knowledge (SK) on consumer decision making performance. Next we conduct an experiment to 
assess direct and interactive effects of OK and SK on consumer information processing 
operations when selecting an insurance policy. By analyzing coded think-aloud verbal protocols, 
we explore how participants with high and low OK / SK frame or structure the decision task, 
how they process the provided information, and how much cognitive effort is expended to 
complete the task (measured in time spent problem solving and total information processing 
operations). Conclusions and limitations complete the paper.   
 5 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
A clear distinction between OK (or objective knowledge) and SK (or self-perceived knowledge) 
has been established in the literature (for a review, see Alba and Hutchinson, 2000). OK 
accumulates principally through a long-term learning process whereas SK represents a person's 
situation-bound assessment of his or her knowledge. Moorman et al. (2004) point out that OK 
and SK are: 1) distinct constructs with unique measures (Brucks, 1985); 2) may affect 
consumers’ search and choice behavior differently (Radecki and Jaccard, 1995; Raju et al., 
1995); and 3) have different antecedents (Park, Mothersbaugh and Feick, 1994; Radecki and 
Jaccard, 1995).  Carlson et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis comparing the correlation 
between OK and SK and found that correlations ranged from -0.15 to 0.68, with an average 
correlation of 0.37. The variance in correlations between these constructs was partially explained 
by product related characteristics (e.g., search versus experience goods) as well as how OK and 
SK were measured.  
Broadly speaking, an individual can fall into one of four categories: they correctly assess 
that their actual knowledge is low (low SK, low OK) or high (high SK, high OK), or they 
overestimate their domain specific knowledge (high SK, low OK), or they underestimate their 
knowledge (low SK, high OK).  When levels of OK and SK correspond the individual “knows 
what they know”, whether or not that level of knowledge is high or low. However, when an 
individual believes their domain specific knowledge is high when in fact objective measures 
reveal their knowledge is low, there is an ‘illusion-of-knowing’ (Glenberg, Wilkinson and 
Epstein, 1982; Radecki and Jaccard, 1995).  Naturally, falling prey to false confidence, or pseudo 
knowledge, can lead to poor judgments (Mehta, Hoegg and Chakravarti, 2011).  Conversely, an 
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individual with high OK may perceive herself as less knowledgeable than they actually are, an 
‘illusion-of-not-knowing’. Hadar et al. (2013) flags an interesting paradox: programs designed to 
educate consumers (raise OK), such as providing elaborate mutual fund related information, may 
inadvertently lower SK.  In one of their studies this paradox led to decreasing investments in the 
fund that provided more elaborate information.   
Hadar et al. (2013, p. 305) comment that OK “is more strongly related to ability and 
expertise, whereas SK is more strongly related to product-related experience and consumers’ 
confidence in their ability to make effective decisions”. Interestingly, there is not a consensus as 
to how either of these affect information search.  One view is that a low self-assessment of one's 
knowledge (low SK) increases one’s motivation to learn more than a high self-assessment, 
especially when the complexity of the problem-solving task does not exceed one's capability to 
solve the problem.  If true, a negative relationship exists between one’s knowledge level and the 
amount of information search. This is consistent with studies on learning that have revealed that 
the illusion of knowing may be a major obstacle to effective learning (Glenberg et al., 1982).  
However, other researchers have found support for a positive relationship between one’s 
knowledge level and information search (Mishra and Kumar, 2013; Raju et al., 1995).  A view 
reconciling these disparate perspectives is that there is an inverted-U relationship between 
information search and one’s knowledge level.  There is initially a positive relationship between 
search effort and knowledge level, however, as problems become increasingly complex such that 
they overwhelm a decision maker’s ability, or the problem is trivial relative to the decision 
maker’s knowledge, effort expended to solve the problem can decrease.  There is support for an 
inverted-U search effort  knowledge relationship (Brucks, 1985).  
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Barring trivial choices, consumers often do not have complete rules or heuristics stored in 
memory for decision making. Payne (1976; Payne and Bettman, 1992; Bettman, Luce and Payne, 
1998) found that the use of different choice heuristics is contingent upon the choice task. 
Research guided by this contingency perspective has examined relatively stable properties of the 
decision environment, such as time pressure. For example, Payne and Bettman (1992; Ackert, 
Church and Tkac, 2010) reported that under severe time pressure people tend to accelerate their 
processing and focus on subsets of information compared to if they had more time. With respect 
to task characteristics, studies have found that if a decision involves only two or three 
alternatives each with limited information individuals may use relatively complicated 
compensatory decision strategies; but in more complex environments (many options and/or 
attributes) they instead invoke simpler, non-compensatory strategies (Bettman, Johnson & 
Payne, 1990; Payne, 1976).  Collectively, studies such as these have shown that consumer 
decision-processes are influenced by both content (e.g., the amount, type and format of 
information) and contextual factors (such as time pressure).  Importantly, these examples 
demonstrate that people are capable of consciously and actively controlling their decision 
processes.  
It stands to reason that in contingent choice tasks there is much room for both OK and SK 
to influence decision making. For example, Hadar et al. (2013) noticed that those with high SK 
were more willing to pursue risky investments.  In a study investigating differences in problem 
solving strategies as a result of expertise (OK), Kuusela et al. (1998) found that experts invoked 
more complex compensatory decision rules and were less prone to misunderstanding information 
than were novices, the latter partially explaining the greater variance in novices’ choices. They 
did not, however, explore SK.   
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Development of the hypotheses 
The following discussion pertains to what for most people is a novel, non-trivial problem: 
selecting from a set of real-world home insurance problems.  Problems such as these can be 
classified as initially ill-structured, but structurable (Spence and Brucks, 1997).  It is at a mid-
range level of problem complexity, between well-structured and inherently ill-structured 
problems, that high versus low OK differences are expected to be realized.  This is because in the 
case of simple problems less knowledgeable individuals may perform as well as experts, whereas 
in the case of inherently ill-structured problems, such as long range forecasting, even experts are 
likely to have widely differing opinions (Spence and Brucks 1997). To solve non-trivial 
problems requires two broad actions: setting up or framing the problem (imposing a structure 
onto the problem), and then having done so invoke idiosyncratic decision rules, such as 
comparing alternatives across attributes.    
Participants with high OK tend to have more richly formatted information domain 
specific schemata (Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser and Farr, 1988, 2014). As 
familiarity with the issue under consideration increases, individuals’ knowledge becomes more 
cohesively organized and the links between different concepts become stronger and more 
numerous (Fiske, Kinder and Larter, 1983). More knowledgeable participants can encode, 
categorize and make sense of large amounts of information more efficiently (Cokely, Kelley and 
Gilchrist, 2006). They are also more flexible and selective in their use of external information 
(Johnson, 1988). This selectivity means that in decision environments with large amounts of 
information, experts tend to use less information – they are more likely to know what 
information is important and choose accordingly (Spence and Brucks, 1997). They can more 
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quickly impose a structure onto the problem at hand relative to less knowledgeable decision 
makers, which guides information search. Investigations have shown that expertise is very much 
domain-specific (Chi et al., 1988).  
With these insights, we advance an overarching ‘ability to process’ hypothesis that 
suggests that participants with high OK can more quickly impose a frame (structure) onto the 
problem at hand, and are more efficient (selective) at acquiring externally available information.  
It is reasonable to assume that they would be less prone to misunderstanding information than 
would low OK participants (Kuusela et al., 1998).  Collectively, they would be faster at problem 
solving.  Thus, 
H1: Low OK individuals, relative to high OK individuals, will: 
a) spend more time solving the problem; 
b) engage in more overall Information Processing Operations (IPOs); 
c) engage in more problem framing related activity; 
d) be more prone to misunderstanding provided information. 
 
People with high SK may erroneously think they have appropriate domain relevant 
knowledge, an illusion of knowing (Glenberg et al., 1982).  Assuming the task is non-trivial, 
high SK individuals are likely to expend less effort than if they had low SK. Being self-assured, 
they may feel that little effort is required to resolve the decision at hand. Conversely, low SK is 
likely to heighten one’s motivation to more carefully process task relevant information. Given 
their self-acknowledged lack of domain-specific expertise, they are likely to expend more effort 
‘figuring out the problem’, that is, framing or structuring the problem in order to enhance clarity 
regarding the issue at hand. They are likely to be relatively more thorough and exhaustive in 
their information processing than those with high SK. Based on the above, we present an 
overarching ‘increased effort’ hypothesis. Thus, 
H2: Low SK individuals, relative to high SK individuals, will: 
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a) spend more time solving the problem; 
b) engage in more overall Information Processing Operations (IPOs); 
c) engage in more problem framing related activity. 
 
Barring the lack of a position concerning ‘misunderstandings’ due to SK, H1 and H2, if 
supported, would suggest that OK and SK have similar ramifications despite the fact that the 
drivers of behavior are different: OK has to do with real and relevant problem related schemata 
whereas SK has more to do with perceived ability and motivation. Some have found support for 
the constructs being seemingly interchangeable (Mishra and Kumar, 2011), but others have 
found differential effects (Radecki and Jaccard, 1995; Raju et al., 1995, albeit some effects were 
directional). Even if the effects of OK and SK parallel each other, a question still remains about 
the relative size of the effects caused by OK and SK. Furthermore, what happens if the level of 
OK and SK are not in accord (i.e., low SK/high OK or high SK/low OK)?  Our supposition is 
that motivation, driven by SK, has a stronger effect than does ability, driven by OK.  If so, this 
would suggest that: 
H3: Low SK/high OK individuals, relative to high SK/low OK individuals, will:  
a) spend more time solving the problem; 
b) engage in more overall Information Processing Operations (IPOs); 
c) engage in more problem framing related activity. 
 
The number of misunderstanding would still be driven by OK levels, thus lower in the 
low SK/high OK condition relative to the high SK/low OK condition.  Collectively, the 
hypotheses being tested are encapsulated in Table 1. 
 
<< insert TABLE 1 about here >> 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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Study overview 
Sixty-four business students, aged 20 to 29, were selected from two Finnish Universities. 
Participants were informed that they would be completing a decision making task that would 
take about an hour, and were offered €10 for their participation. These subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of four treatment conditions.  The study examines the effect of two manipulated 
explanatory variables, subjective knowledge (SK) and objective knowledge (OK), on six 
dependent variables: framing related statements, holistic evaluations, attribute level comparisons, 
misunderstandings, other (including choice related statements) and decision time.  A seventh 
variable, the sum of all these information processing operations (IPOs), was also analyzed. 
Decision making context 
Several criteria were considered when choosing an appropriate decision making context. First 
was external validity. The decision task, selecting a residential insurance contract, represented a 
decision most individuals would be expected to make in their lifetimes, but not one done 
frequently, hence would have a low level of familiarity. Such problems are likely to involve 
extended decision making.  Data provided were based on real-world insurance policies offered 
from five different companies, although the quantity of data was held constant across 
alternatives.  Second, we wanted a decision context that OK could vary significantly.  The two 
universities from which participants were selected both had insurance related courses. Third, the 
decision target was chosen to be neither too easy nor too demanding – to be ill-structured, but 
structurable. The purpose was to ensure that there was an opportunity for participants' SK and 
OK to come into play. Fourth, the decision could be made without the participants requiring 
prior knowledge about the alternatives.  
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The terminology used in product descriptions was essentially the same as in the product 
displays found in insurance offices or on the internet, although persuasive and evocative 
expressions were excluded. For each alternative, there was information on ten insurance 
attributes/items, such as scope of coverage, items and events not covered, sum insured, and 
premium (see Appendix B for the complete list).  For four of the attributes the information was 
held constant across all five insurance policies, thus the offerings differed on the remaining six 
dimensions.  Like the real-world, there was not a dominant option. 
The Procedure 
Data collection consisted of three parts. First, we conducted the SK experimental manipulation. 
Second, we collected the simulated purchase situation data using a concurrent verbal protocol 
technique. Third, we gave the participants a concluding questionnaire. 
SK was manipulated using a two-step process. First, all participants were requested to 
answer multiple choice questions about insurance specific facts and terminology; however, the 
questions differed in their level of difficulty. Participants in the high SK group received ten easy 
true-false questions, involving general knowledge about insurance-specific facts and 
terminology, whereas the participants in the low SK condition received ten difficult true-false 
questions involving insurance specific facts and terminology. The items in the questionnaire 
were not used in the subsequent experimental choice task.  
After they answered the questions, feedback was provided to the participants (Park et al., 
1988; Park et al., 1994). To amplify SK, the participants who answered the relatively easy 
questions were given positive feedback. These participants were told that their responses were 
100% correct, and were praised for their superb performance and high level of product 
knowledge. They were informed that less than 5% of respondents provide a 100 % correct 
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response. By providing such positive feedback, the participants were encouraged to assess their 
level of domain knowledge ‘highly’. On the other hand, participants in the low SK condition 
were given negative feedback. They were told, regardless of their actual performance on the 
relatively hard true-false questions, that they had done very poorly and that much information 
had to be mastered by them before they could understand the product class. To ensure that the 
participants were not disheartened and that they would continue to participate actively, they were 
assured that such knowledge was not a prerequisite for the study. Collectively this two-step 
manipulation process allowed participants to perceive gaps in their knowledge and to create the 
phenomenon we were striving to generate: the illusion of knowing or the illusion of not knowing.  
Regarding OK, the low OK group consisted of students who had never taken an 
insurance course, whereas the high OK group consisted of students who had taken at least one 
insurance course.  Given these two means to manipulate subjective and objective knowledge 
levels, a balanced 2x2 design could be achieved. This is an important departure from prior work 
and ensures that half the subjects have a positively correlated OK/SK relationship and half do 
not. Hadar et al. (2013) demonstrate that providing more financial training can paradoxically 
decrease one’s SK, which in turn was shown to have deleterious choice related consequences.  In 
their studies OK was held constant or controlled; herein the design is balanced, thus allowing the 
ability to separate SK from OK effects. Further, the focus herein is on decision processes rather 
than choices, because there was not a correct choice. 
In the second part, participants provided verbal concurrent protocols while selecting an 
insurance policy.  They were given the following instructions: “Consider that you are an 
unmarried person in possession of a condominium of two rooms and a kitchen in a multistory 
apartment building. Your apartment is 50 m2 in size, and insurance companies have estimated its 
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insurable value at € 20,000. According to the companies, you don't own personal property (e.g., 
collections, art, jewelry) that would cause particular policy considerations. Your property is thus 
ordinary.” Participants were then told, “The insurance companies (referred to A, B, C, D and E 
to remove any brand name effects) have made their offers as described in the following. I will 
present them to you, and you are to select one among them. When you are making your decision, 
I will ask you to think aloud, i.e., verbally report all your thoughts, arguments, and whatever 
occurs to you while you are making your decision. It is very important that you report all your 
thoughts emerging in making the decision.” 
Participants were interviewed one at a time; there was no time constraint. Protocol data 
are stated cognitions, a rationalized decision process. It is reasonable to assume that in real-life 
first time insurance related decisions are thoughtfully made and not driven by overly simplistic 
decision heuristics.  Three participants expressed difficulty with verbally reporting their thoughts 
during the task and were therefore dropped and replaced to keep the design balanced. 
Participants’ think-aloud protocols were recorded for the purpose of analysis (for a review of 
protocol data, see Ericsson, 2006).  
After the verbal protocol task, manipulation checks were taken for both SK and OK.  
There is no agreed upon means to assess SK (Carlson et al., 2009) although OK is traditionally 
measured by a multiple choice test.  Herein, to tap SK respondents answered seven 5-point 
semantic differential scale questions, such as “How good is your familiarity with the concepts 
and terminology of homeowner's insurance?”  For OK, participants answered 20 “what is meant 
by” questions about terminology and facts about homeowner's insurance. 
 
ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 15 
 
Manipulation checks 
The seven measures used to tap SK were summed to form a single construct (Cronbach alpha = 
.84).  As anticipated, those in the low SK condition had significantly lower mean scores than did 
those in the high SK condition (means = 22.44 versus 25.00, t = -2.44, p = .017).  Similarly, 
those that had not taken an insurance course (low OK condition) scored significantly lower on 
the 20 question exam (maximum possible score equaled 30) than did those in the high SK 
condition (means = 18.56 versus 22.34, t = -4.73, p < .01).  
Protocol analysis 
The tape recorded protocols were first transcribed and then broken into a sequence of task 
relevant information processing operations (IPOs), and then coded by two independent judges. 
These judges performed the coding after four-days of practice on sample transcripts and were 
blind about the purpose of the study and the treatment conditions. The coding procedure 
involved coding 4,965 IPOs. The inter-coder agreement rate was 94 % and ambiguities were 
resolved through mutual discussions. Sample comments representative of the different coding 
categories are shown in Appendix A.  Frequencies of thoughts by category appear in Table 2. 
 
<< Insert TABLE 2 about here >> 
 
The Dependent Variables 
The first two analyses explore the effect of SK and OK on decision processes at a high level, 
namely overall decision time in minutes and the total number of information processing 
operations.  Not surprisingly, decision time and total IPOs are correlated (r = .442, p = .01).  
Research to date regarding the time required to solve problems is mixed, albeit the general 
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finding is that ‘experts’ can solve problems faster than can less knowledgeable decision makers 
(for differing views, compare Spence and Brucks, 1997, to Johnson, 1988).  Findings from a 2x2 
ANOVA with time-in-minutes the dependent variable supported the supposition that more 
knowledgeable decision makers, whether perceived (high SK) or real (high OK) solved the 
problem faster:  there was a significant main effect for SK (F(1, 60) = 8.709, p = .005, partial η2 
= .127) as well as for OK (F(1,60) = 18.871, p < .01, partial η2 = .239). The two-way interaction 
was not significant (p = .50). (These values were essentially unaffected if the natural log of time 
was used as the dependent variable instead of elapsed clock time.)  Thus, OK is exhibiting a 
large effect size on decision time and SK a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). Thus, both H1a 
and H2a are supported.  A perusal of each cell’s mean (see Table 2) indicates that the time to 
complete the task increases steadily from high SK/high AK (HH = 15.63 minutes) to low SK/low 
AK (LL = 28.06 minutes).  Post hoc analyses using Least Significant Differences reveal several 
significant differences (LL is significantly different and higher than all three remaining 
conditions (all p’s <.013), and HL is significantly different and higher than HH (p = .012)). 
However, the data does not lend support for H3a, that there would be a significant difference 
between LH (low SK and high OK) and HL. 
An analysis of total information processing operations (IPOs) largely echoes the findings 
of decision time: the main effect of SK is (F(1, 60) = 10.519, p = .002, partial η2 = .149) and for 
OK (F(1,60) = 7.071, p =.010, partial η2 = .105). In this case, SK is exhibiting a somewhat larger, 
medium effect size relative to OK than was the case with total decision time.  The two-way 
interaction is not significant (p = .556).  H1b and H2b are therefore supported. As can be seen by 
the cell means (Table 2), the big jumps in IPOs are from HH, LH and HL to LL (all three post 
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hoc two-way comparisons are significant (all p’s < .026); no other pairwise comparisons are 
significant (p’s > .05).  H3b is therefore not supported. 
With this overall picture as a backdrop, subsequent analyses explore the components that 
make-up total IPOs.  Researchers differ regarding how to categorize IPOs (Bettman and Park, 
1980a; Johnson, 1988; Jacoby et al., 2001), but problem resolution is acknowledged as a 
multistep process requiring identifying what issues and which inputs to consider – what we call 
‘framing the problem’ – and then evaluating and integrating the selected inputs to reach a 
decision (Spence & Brucks, 1997). Problem framing activity included statements regarding their 
plans or needs, posing questions to themselves about alternatives, or familiarizing themselves 
with the data provided, such as reading but not comparing the values of attributes. A 2x2 
ANOVA was therefore run with framing the dependent variable and SK and OK the independent 
variables.  Both main effects were significant in the predicted direction (F(1, 60) = 10.418, p = 
.002, partial η2 = .148 for SK) and (F(1,60) = 4.854, p = .031, partial η2 = .075 for OK), thus 
suggesting a medium effect size for SK and a small to medium effect size for OK.  H1c and H2c 
are therefore supported.  The two-way interaction was not significant (p = .680). 
Post hoc pairwise comparisons across the four conditions revealed that the significant 
differences are largely driven by the difference between high SK/high OK (HH condition, mean 
= 26.44) and low SK/low OK (LL condition, mean = 62.88, p < .01).  There was no significant 
difference between LH and HL (means = 45.31 and 38.44, respectively, p = .472), thus H3c is 
not supported.  It appears that when there is an inconsistency between what individuals think 
they know versus what they actually know, it does not matter whether they over- (HL) or under-
estimate (LH) their actual knowledge. Overall, knowledgeable decision makers can more quickly 
impose a structure onto the problem and start solving the insurance task problem (i.e., make 
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product comparisons), whereas less knowledgeable decision makers spend more effort setting-up 
the problem, thinking through their needs and getting an understanding on what types of 
information are available (Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981; Spence and Brucks, 1997). 
Interestingly, differences in the number of problem framing statements across the four conditions 
largely explain the differences in total IPOs.  Excluding problem framing, there are statistically 
significant differences between the four groups in the remaining IPOs (F(3, 60) = 3.186, p = 
.030), with the means trending-up gently from HH (mean = 28.1) to LL (mean = 40.9). 
The next analyses explored misunderstandings.  The overall ANOVA was significant 
(F(3,60) = 4.023, p = .011); this was driven by a significant main effect for OK in the anticipated 
direction (mean = 3.19 for low OK and 1.06 for high OK, F(1, 60) = 11.055, p = .002, partial η2  
= .156, medium OK effect size). Neither the main effect for SK nor the two-way interaction was 
significant (p > .38).  H1d is therefore supported.  Post hoc analyses revealed no significant 
differences between the two high OK conditions (HH and LH, p = .337) and the two low OK 
conditions (HL and LL, p = .783). However, there was a significant difference between LH and 
HL (means equal 0.63 and 3.31 respectively, p = <.01).  Low objective knowledge is driving up 
misunderstandings. 
No specific hypotheses were proposed regarding holistic processes, attribute comparisons 
or ‘other processing operations’, although these categories of processing operations have been 
explored in expert/novice comparisons (Kuusela et al. 1998). Holistic processes refer to overall 
evaluations of alternatives and are non-analytical in nature. Research has shown that experienced 
consumers tend to use fewer items to evaluate products and rely more heavily on global 
evaluations (Bettman and Park, 1980a; Park and Lessig, 1981). Although experience is not the 
same as OK (Brucks, 1985; Raju et al., 1995), these findings are consistent with the ‘ability to 
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process’ hypothesis which would suggest that the number of holistic processes would be 
positively related to OK.  However, the resultant ANOVA model was not significant (F(3, 60) = 
1.152, p = .336).  Cell means across the four conditions appear in Table 2. 
The ANOVA exploring the effect on attribute comparisons by SK and OK was 
significant (F(3, 60) = 2.805, p = .047).  This was driven by a significant main effect for SK (F(1, 
60) = 7.665, p .007, partial η2  = .113). Neither the main effect for OK nor the two-way 
interaction were significant (p > .40).  High levels of SK significantly lower the number of 
attribute comparisons, but there is no discernable pattern concerning the effect of OK. Attribute 
comparisons are more complex and effortful decision processes than are, for instance, using 
holistic processing. These findings suggest high SK participants used less complex decision rules 
(attribute comparisons) than those with low SK.  Post hoc LSD analyses revealed two significant 
pairwise differences:  HH versus LL (means = 13.44 versus 21.31 respectively, p = .013) and HL 
versus LL (means = 14.88 and 21.31, p = .041).  The mean for LH was 19.06, marginally 
significantly different from HH (p = .073).  
The ANOVA analysis addressing the ‘other’ category, which included choice related 
statements, revealed no significant differences (F(3, 60) = 1.787, p = .159).  
Effect of knowledge structures on choice 
The five insurance policy options comprising the decision task were all based on real-world 
offerings. Thus, unlike studies that have an underlying measure to assess the goodness of 
decision making, such as fund performance or adherence to specific strategies (Ackert et al., 
2010; Hadar et al., 2013; Jacoby et al., 2001), herein there was no correct choice: each policy has 
strengths and weaknesses relative to the alternative offerings.  No speculation was therefore 
made as to how SK or OK would affect final choices. 
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 Table 3 provides frequency counts of the five choices by the four treatment conditions.  
Two insights emerge: 1) there is no statistically significant difference between groups (p > .05 
even if choices are combined to remove cells with counts of zero); and 2) choices were 
concentrated in three of the five offerings. 
<< insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Two overarching theories motivated this study: the ‘ability to process hypothesis’, driven by OK, 
and the ‘increased effort hypothesis’, driven by SK. The ‘ability to process hypothesis’ received 
widespread support: high relative to low OK subjects were faster at solving the problem, 
engaged fewer overall information processing operations, spent less effort framing the problem, 
and were less likely to misunderstand information. Information processing operations (IPOs) 
provide an extensive, componential view of underlying decision processes (Bettman et al. 1990). 
Herein those with high OK invoked one third fewer IPOs than did those with low OK (65.6 
versus 87.8), and much of that difference could be explained by fewer framing related statements 
(35.9 versus 50.7). This provides more direct insight that a benefit of expertise is the ability to 
impose structure onto ill-structured, but structurable problems (Spence and Brucks, 1997). 
However, there is no indication that choices were systematically affected by high versus low OK. 
Systematic differences would suggest that a common – and most likely simplistic – decision rule 
was used.  This does not appear to be the case. 
With respect to subjective knowledge, there was an inverse relationship between SK and 
effort expended as measured by IPOs, which is consistent with our ‘increased effort hypothesis’.  
Generally, SK and OK tend to be correlated (Carlson et al. 2009), but this does not need to be the 
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case.  The SK/OK manipulations in our study allowed us to create both consistency and 
divergence with existing research, which is one of the major contributions of this study. Our 
supposition was that a low assessment of one’s knowledge would stimulate them to work harder 
in order to better comprehend the situation. Empirical findings supported this view. Those low in 
SK expended more effort framing the problem, spent more time reaching a decision, and invoked 
a greater number of IPOs. This poses a conundrum to marketers of less well known products as 
well as those selling a range of complex options, both of which could apply to insurance 
companies as well as a vendors of other financial offerings: thoughtful decision making would be 
desirable, yet the higher one’s knowledge level, whether real (OK) or imagined (SK), the less the 
cognitive effort expended. 
Hadar et al. (2013, study 3) found that providing technical and elaborate mutual fund 
information lowered SK and reduced the number choosing the elaborated option, which for the 
affected fund is certainly undesirable. In their study, all student subjects had completed multiple 
courses in finance and economics, yet the addition of just a few more technical product related 
sentences was sufficient to raise self-doubt (lower SK) and alter choice.  The authors (Hadar et 
al. 2013, p. 313) comment that, “we do not propose that financial education programs should be 
abandoned. Instead, we argue that financial educators should pay special attention to their impact 
on consumers’ SK about what they have learned”. Given the insights gleaned from our study, it 
is prudent to assume expertise – whether real or imagined – will reduce information processing, 
hence marketers must think carefully about how to present information (to ease problem 
framing) as well as whether some product features are highlighted to encourage the processing of 
critical features at the possible expense of overlooking other features. 
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In an environment with an objective performance measure (ROI), Jacoby et al. (2001) 
showed that novices are capable of learning a small number of decision inputs to access (in their 
case, four) when assessing a stock’s potential and that this improved their stock portfolio 
performance, although participants were not restricted to just four pieces of information. 
Insurance does not have such an objective performance measure, nevertheless insurance 
companies could facilitate information acquisition and processing by posing questions to direct 
search and possibly reduce the choice set if a provider offers an array of options (e.g., “Do you  
have personal valuables in excess of € ______?”).  Insurance decisions, whether home, health or 
automobile, are for many individuals complex decisions and are often made with assistance from 
salespeople.  Personal selling is flexible; sales messages can be adapted to specific customer's 
needs and beliefs, thus providing an opportunity for salespeople to influence both SK and OK 
consciously and systematically. Here we showed that SK can be manipulated by the complexity 
of the questions asked of decision makers as well as by how one reacts to responses.  It seems 
reasonable to assume that a salesperson could easily rectify the ‘raising OK can decrease SK’ 
paradox flagged by Hadar et al. (2013). 
Furthermore, while the effect of OK and SK is well known to decrease decision making 
efforts, our study demonstrated their effects separately (by segregating them via our 
experimental design).  This implies salespeople can choose to increase or decrease customers’ 
OK and/or SK effectively that can render different levels of decision making efforts as well as 
different levels of dependence on the salespeople’s expertise.  However, as our study found, SK 
does not always trump OK.  This means salespeople must pay attention to the OK level of their 
customers if they are to enhance/reduce their SK. 
 23 
 
Our findings are both consistent with and different from, those of Mishra and Kumar 
(2011).  Similar to their findings, we noticed both OK and SK had similar effects; however, 
contrary to their findings we found an inverse relationship between OK and SK, and decision 
effort (time, IPOs, and framing statements).  In their study on mutual fund decisions, decision 
processing was assessed by having subjects rate pre-determined features, such as their intentions 
to use a broker (to tap information search) or how much they would use specific pieces of 
information, such as reputation of fund manager (to measure depth of processing). Our study is 
more natural.  Decision makers spoke aloud as they made their decision, a common means to 
unearth decision processes (c.f., Bettman and Park 1980b; Brucks 1985; Ericsson 2006; Kuusela 
et al. 1998). While verbal protocols can be criticized for encouraging rationalization of one’s 
decision making, it does not draw attention to specific features – features that may have never 
been considered – or provide any indication to an appropriate decision strategy. Range effects 
are an alternative explanation for why our insights differ from Mishra and Kumar (2011), given 
that an inverted-U relationship between knowledge levels and search has received support 
(Brucks 1985).  What was presented to participants here is consistent with the real-world: most 
individuals rarely consider more than five options, the number of options presented herein; and 
the option-related information at their disposal was taken from marketing material for those 
products. There was no correct strategy or a correct choice. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Information not provided within our experiment were the brand names.  Sinn et al. (2007) found 
that the relative familiarity of brands within a choice set can reverse the compromise effect.  If 
the middle option was less familiar, the compromise effect was mitigated.  However, if one 
option was superior to another (information on four attributes was provided), the effect of brand 
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familiarity on choice was diminished.  The authors raise an intriguing unanswered question (Sinn 
et al. 2007, p. 233): “More generally, the question is when are consumer choices driven more by 
brand characteristics than by a comparison of the relative attribute positions of each alternative 
(i.e., when do brands matter)?”  While they did not assess either OK or SK, it appears that 
decision makers in their study 2 carefully considered the provided attribute information to 
discern product differences (thereby identifying the superior option), which would be more 
consistent with the actions of low SK or low OK individuals. However, relying on brand names 
is a simplifying choice heuristic often invoked in low involvement, habitual decision making 
contexts, which does not characterize insurance decisions, at least in reference to the first time an 
individual has to make such a decision. Recall there were no differences in choices due to 
treatment condition which suggests there was not commonality in decision rules used. 
Another avenue to consider is how consumer decision making is affected by on-line 
opinions.  Simonson and Rosen (2014) propose that there is a zero-sum game between 
consumers relying on their prior preferences/personal experience, marketer controlled 
information (studied herein) and other people’s opinions – the latter vastly increasing in 
popularity given the proliferation of on-line rating websites.  Relying more on one of these three 
sources of information when making decision suggests a diminished role for one or both of the 
others. Many of us probably look at user ratings of hotels or restaurants to make a choice; but 
how about when choosing on-going and financially committing relationships, like insurance? 
Our insights found high SK and high OK led to less effortful decision making.  Would this mean 
a greater willingness to seek and incorporate on-line opinions?  That seems counter-intuitive 
given their real or perceived expertise.   
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Despite studies measuring differences in types of consumer knowledge and insights 
regarding their relative effects referenced within this manuscript, research on financial services is 
sparse (Braunsberger et al. 2004; Hadar et al. 2013; Mishra and Kumar 2011).  Clear patterns 
emerged in our study showing an inverse relationship between SK and OK, and IPOs, which 
contradicts previous findings. We examined a non-trivial, information rich insurance task where 
there was no dominant option.  While evidence suggests SK and OK tend to be correlated, they 
do not have to be.  By using a novel way to manipulate SK – which could be adapted by 
salespeople in real-world contexts – we ensured that SK and OK were not always in accord.  
High (low) SK and high (low) OK exhibited similar effects on effort expended.  Whether high or 
low, there were no discernable differences in final choices, suggesting that no group jumped to a 
simplifying choice heuristic.  Instead, those low in knowledge compensated for this deficiency 
by taking more time framing the problem and reaching a thoughtful decision, a decision process 
that weakens the effect of branding. 
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Table 1. Summary of hypothesized effects of SK and OK 
 
 
 
 
Low OK 
  
High OK 
 
Low SK OK/SK are positively correlated 
• spend more time solving the 
problem; 
• engage in more problem 
framing related activity; 
• are more prone to 
misunderstanding provided 
information; 
• engage in more overall 
Information Processing 
Operations (IPOs). 
 
OK/SK are not correlated 
• spend more time solving 
the problem; 
• engage in more problem 
framing related activity; 
• are less prone to 
misunderstanding 
provided information; 
• engage in more overall 
Information Processing 
Operations (IPOs). 
 
High SK OK/SK are not correlated 
• spend less time solving the 
problem; 
• engage in less problem 
framing related activity; 
• are more to 
misunderstanding provided 
information; 
• engage in less overall 
Information Processing 
Operations (IPOs). 
 
OK/SK are positively correlated 
• spend less time solving 
the problem; 
• engage in less problem 
framing related activity; 
• are less prone to 
misunderstanding 
provided information; 
• engage in less overall 
Information Processing 
Operations (IPOs). 
 
• Most studies have shown OK and SK to be positively correlated, although correlations 
differ widely (Carlson et al. 2009).  Individuals can certainly over- or under-estimate 
their true knowledge levels (OK).  Endeavoring to raise OK by providing additional 
information can have the perverse effect of lowering one’s SK (Hadar et al. 2013). 
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Table 2. Mean count in each coding category by treatment condition 
  
High SK 
& High OK 
HH 
 
Low SK 
& High OK 
LH 
 
High SK 
& Low 
OK 
HL 
 
 
Low SK 
& Low 
OK 
LL 
Number of problem framing activities 26.44 45.31 38.44 62.88 
Number of holistic processes 10.06 8.25 11.31 11.56 
Number of attribute 
evaluations/comparisons 
13.44 19.06 14.88 21.31 
Number of misunderstandings 1.50 0.63 3.31 3.06 
Other processing operations 3.13 3.44 3.88 5.00 
Number of total information 
processing operations 
54.56 76.69 71.81 103.81 
Decision time (in minutes) 15.63 19.50 21.88 28.06 
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Table 3. Insurance policy choice by treatment condition 
 
             Decision 
Condition 
Total HH LH HL LL 
 A Count 4 5 6 4 19 
Expected 
Count 
4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 19.0 
B Count 1 1 0 2 4 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 
C Count 7 5 4 4 20 
Expected 
Count 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 
D Count 4 5 3 6 18 
Expected 
Count 
4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 18.0 
E Count 0 0 3 0 3 
Expected 
Count 
.8 .8 .8 .8 3.0 
Total Count 16 16 16 16 64 
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Appendix A.   Illustrative coding categories and examples quotes (translated from Finnish) 
 
A. Framing statements 
 
"I don't have any unusually valuable property" 
“How is it with respect to deductible and premium?” 
 
 
B. Holistic processing 
 
Alternative evaluation: "By the way, A is really a bad option" 
Feature evaluation:  "All of the alternatives have index clauses" 
 
C.  Attribute evaluations/comparisons 
 
"B has the highest premium of them" 
"A has € 58 premium, deductible is only € 100, € 100 in liability insurance, it's € 300 in  
householder's insurance. C, replacement value is € 20,000 and indeed covers radio and TV set 
and other electric appliances, that is not covered in A. And then it covers money up to € 400, 
that's enough and indoor repairs up to € 3,000, it's enough for me" 
 
D.  Misunderstandings 
 
"Insurance is € 100"    (incorrect value) 
"Here is a term ‘underinsurance’ that I don't understand" 
 
 
E. Other processing operations (including choice related statements) 
 
"Of course the insurance is more expensive if the deductible is lower" 
"I think I would take E" 
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Appendix B.   Information available to decision makers 
Objective of Insurance:  Homeowner’s insurance, which covers your home and possessions like 
money (up to € 1,000), domestic belongings and tools for gainful employment. However, for 
unusually valuable possessions, itemization is recommended. 
Scope of Validity:  The insurance is valid at the site specified in the policy and temporarily all 
over the world. The liability and legal protection insurance are valid all over the world. 
Scope of Coverage:  The insurance covers damage caused by a sudden and unexpected 
occurrence. The insurance includes liability and legal protection insurance. 
Items and Events Not Covered:  The Insurance does not cover damage caused by normal wear 
and tear, rust, spoilage, or an equivalent gradual phenomenon and damage to property through 
loss or carelessness. 
Sum Insured:  The sum insured is determined on the basis of the square meters of the apartment. 
Maximum Coverage:  Underinsurance is not possible, and the indemnity is always paid in full. 
For the liability insurance, the maximum coverage is € 100,000, and the legal protection 
insurance is € 10,000. 
Deductible:  € 180. For the liability insurance, the deductible is € 180 and for the legal 
protection insurance, 15 % of the indemnifiable costs, yet not less than € 200. 
Additional Indemnity:  The insurance covers interruption of residence caused by damage at 5 % 
per month at the most (in this case € 250/month) for a period not exceeding 6 months. 
Premium:  € 64 per annum. 
Index Clauses:  The insurance is index-bound with regard to sum insured, deductible, and 
premium. 
